The internecine dogs of war have slipped. NRO Editors have a trenchant editorial today on l'affaire Rumsfeld. And again, I have to come down on their side.
Behind much of the criticism of Rumsfeld is the idea that he has disastrously skimped on troop levels, especially when it comes to the occupation. But insurgencies aren't crushed by sheer numbers. Would that it were so. Counter-insurgency depends on intelligence and a sound political strategy, which in this case involves integrating Iraqi forces into the fight and moving ahead with the elections. Given that more troops would require an even larger logistical tail (read: more Humvees and "soft" vehicles carrying supplies, i.e. more targets) to support them, it makes sense that commanders on the ground aren't asking for significantly more troops.The agenda of most of Rumsfeld's critics is clear: to wound the administration and discredit the war effort by taking the scalp of one of its architects. Some of those coming at Rumsfeld from the right have a more subtle concern. They can't bear to admit that Iraq has been more difficult than they ever dared imagine, because of the irreducible reality of political and social conditions on the ground. Remaking societies by military means can be harder, bloodier work than some neoconservatives care to acknowledge. That doesn't mean it's not worth it, or that our project still won't succeed in Iraq. We suspect that the January elections will produce a strong a civic statement of the sort we saw in Afghanistan, and thus help shift the political dynamic against the forces of violence.
'Sus, Marie, Josef and NED! Buy whatever magazine you want, bro. But respect the right of a magazine to criticize the administration. I must admit, contra the letter writer, that I appreciate The Weekly Standard more than NR. I will continue to subscribe to both. NR has been a little too religious for me -- I've been hanging around Johngalt too long.
I believe Rumsfeld did skimp on troop levels and did not heed the advice of his generals that it takes a large number of troops to stabilize a country IMMEDIATELY after the shooting has stopped. The power vacuum left is extremely dangerous and at that time superior troop strength is required to institute and be able to enforce order to keep an insurgency from gaining hold with the support of the society at large. The time for more troops has come an gone, they are useful not in combating an insurgency as you suggest, but in keeping it from taking hold in the first place. Once the looting begins and gangs start prowling the streets in the abscence of law and order you start to loose the support of the people. This is Don Rumsfeld's miscalculation of hubris, that his vision of a smaller, faster, more technically empowered military is the answer for all 21st century conflicts. His vision to create this military is to his credit and the concept is sound for the "hot" portion of the war. It just doesn't hold up for the messy and personal task of nation building.
Posted by: Silence Dogood at December 16, 2004 03:16 PMIt is routinely trotted out as fact that the advice of Generals was ignored. I reject this. I think that Secretary Rumsfeld collected opinions and ideas, which included large forces, small forces, and perhaps playing tiddly winks for Baghdad.
Rumsfeld made his choice believing in a smaller-faster-lighter-fewer-target approach. I am not sure that it's wrong and I am absolutely convinced that it was an honest selection, not "ignoring the advice of the Generals."
I am not buying all that. Rumsfeld believed strongly in his smaller, faster, lighter military and I agree that he is not wrong about that, for what he intedended to use the military for. Tough nation building was just not on his radar screen, thanks in part to Ahmed Chalabi and the INC crew and their rosy picture of Iraqis tossing flowers in the street. It seems to me that two factors played strongly at DOD, anything but what Clinton did and anything but what the State Dept. thinks. They didn't want to nation build, and running forth with their pre-conceived notion that they wouldn't have to found all kinds of evidence from the likes of the INC that supported their theory. Once you have this conclusion then you plan troop strength for the invasion, not the aftermath. Paul Wolfowitz now famously (infamously?) stated that he could not imagine the stabilizing of Iraq requiring more troops that the invasion.
Posted by: Silence Dogood at December 17, 2004 08:11 AMI'll admit to being a member of the "they'll throw flowers" camp. Even though I believe a solid majority are very happy, the breadth of the insurgency has been a disappointment.
I still question the call for more troops for nation building. More troops are more targets, more troops require more support from soft vehicles, and more troops provide a more conspicuous feeling of occupation.
All the doom purveyors had nothing but bad predictions for Afghanistan: the brutal Afghan winter, quagmire, burial ground of empires, and all that. I don't think it is Shangri-La, but it is a democracy with a vibrant economy (in Kabul at least).
Lastly, I think that opposing the State Department *is* generally a pretty good idea.